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ABSTRACT 
Public debate continues over whether the United States should regulate genetically modified 
(GM) foods by imposing a mandatory labeling policy.  This paper develops a model that shows 
that a voluntary GM-labeling policy results in higher welfare than a regulated mandatory GM-
labeling policy, if consumers can accurately read the signals in each market.  We then develop an 
experiment that shows consumers behave as if they can accurately identify signals for GM foods.  
Our model and results support the perspective that the United States has been prudent in fending 
off calls for regulations demanding a mandatory GM-labeling policy. 
 
 
Key Words:  genetically modified foods, mandatory labeling, voluntary labeling, laboratory 
auctions, nth-price auction, vegetable oil, tortilla chips, russet potatoes 
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The use of biotechnology to create genetically modified products has been haled by some as a 
major new revolution in product innovation. Public debate, however, continues over whether the 
United States should impose new regulations that require a mandatory labeling policy for 
genetically modified (GM) foods.  Favoring a mandatory labeling regulation for GM foods are 
such groups as Greenpeace (1997), Friends of the Earth (2001), and the Consumer’s Union 
(Consumer Reports, 1999).  Opposing mandatory GM labels include the Council for 
Biotechnology information (2001) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (2001).  
This contentious issue has engaged debate from all sides of the spectrum, yet only modest 
economic work has examined the merits and pitfalls of a new regulation that requires mandatory 
labeling for GM foods in the United States. 
This paper examines the potential welfare effects of imposing a mandatory GM-labeling policy 
in the United States.  We first show that a mandatory labeling policy for GM foods results in 
welfare losses relative to a voluntary labeling policy—assuming consumers accurately 
understand the signals sent in each market regarding which food is GM.  We then describe an 
experimental auction to test the critical presumption that consumers do indeed interpret the 
market signals identically.  For a sample of adult consumers living in two major Midwestern 
cities, our results do not contradict the hypothesis that consumers can interpret voluntary and 
mandatory market signals identically.  These findings suggest that it would be more efficient or 
welfare improving for the United States to continue its voluntary labeling policy and resist calls 
for new regulations that mandate labeling of GM foods. 
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1. BACKGROUND ON GM LABELS AND GM-LABELING POLICIES 
Caswell (1998, 2000) has shown that the list of potential GM labeling policies is large, and 
includes mandatory labeling of GM foods, voluntary labeling of GM foods, and bans on all 
labeling.  The policies that each country chooses are likely to be determined by competitive 
interest group politics (Olsen, 1965).  An informed decision about labeling policies for GM foods 
should only be made after a careful benefit/cost analysis.  Caswell points out that a voluntary 
labeling program is likely to be a better policy option for a country that has only a small segment 
of the population that is concerned about GM foods, while a mandatory labeling system is likely 
the best policy option in countries where most of the population wants to know if their food is 
GM.  A model by Kirchhoff and Zago (2001) reached a similar conclusion—voluntary GM-
labeling policies may be better for a country that has more consumers who are concerned with 
cost savings, while mandatory GM-labeling policies may be better for more GM-averse 
consumers. 
The United States does not require mandatory labeling for most GM foods.  In January 2001, the 
FDA issued a “Guidance for Industry” statement for labeling GM products, which stated that the 
only GM foods that need to be labeled are ones that have different characteristics from their non-
GM versions.  Labeling is not required for any other GM foods, but firms in the United States do 
have the option of voluntarily indicating whether their food is GM.  Canada also has a similar 
voluntary labeling policy. 
The European Union (EU) requires that all foods have the label “genetically modified” if any 
ingredient in the food is at least 1 percent GM.  The European Parliament voted for stricter 
regulations in early 2001.  The new regulations call for stricter labeling and monitoring of GM 
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products and allow for the tracing of GM products through the food chain (CNN, 2001).  The EU 
standards are the minimum standards that member countries must adhere to, although countries 
can have stricter standards.  Several other countries around the world have  mandatory labeling 
policies for GM foods, including Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.  For a detailed review of 
labeling policies, see Rousu and Huffman (2001) or Phillips and McNeill (2000). 
2. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY LABELING 
POLICIES 
Some groups think that mandating GM labels would improve a society’s welfare.  Many 
environmental and consumer advocacy groups call for mandatory labeling of GM foods, which 
they believe benefits consumers (Greenpeace, 1997; Friends of the Earth, 2001; Consumer 
Reports, 1999).  Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth both advocate labels on GM foods to give 
consumers the opportunity to choose whether to consume GM foods.   
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service, has analyzed the 
potential benefits of labels on foods (Golan et al., 2000).  One benefit of labels is to make it easy 
for consumers to find content information on food products.  Labeling of foods can lead to more 
informed choices by consumers.  Also, some firms may want to avoid using a label that has 
negative connotations, which could lead firms to improve their product. 
Caswell and Padberg (1992) recommended a comprehensive view of the benefits of labels on 
food products.  These benefits can be above and beyond what are normally considered the typical 
benefits from labels.  The benefits from food labels include increased consumer information, 
improved product design, and more consumer confidence in product quality.  Also, labels can 
provide an option value, even for consumers who do currently read food labels.  This option 
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value exists because, if a food is labeled, consumers always have the option to read the label, 
either now or in the future, and that option has some value. 
Although benefits might exist, implementing a mandatory labeling policy for GM foods would 
be costly.  Biotechnology firms oppose mandatory labeling for all GM foods because they do not 
think foods should be specially labeled unless the food is inherently different from the 
conventional product (Council for Biotechnology Information, 2001).  The USDA, Economic 
Research Service showed that costs associated with implementing a labeling policy (Golan et al., 
2000) are significant.  Identity preservation, to determine whether a particular food is GM, has 
significant fixed costs.  When GM food is separated from non-GM food, the probability 
increases that the wrong product will be delivered to a buyer.  For example, in the United States 
GM corn that was not approved for human consumption, known as Starlink corn, got into the 
U.S. food system in late 2000.  Another possible cost is accidental contamination of non-GM 
crops by their GM counterpart.  Farmers have to go to great lengths to ensure that non-GM crops 
are not accidentally contaminated with the GM variety.  Among the things farmers need to do to 
ensure there is no contamination is to have buffer zones, which are zones between the GM and 
non-GM crops to prevent contamination.  Farmers also need to make sure planting and 
harvesting equipment are not contaminated with residue from GM crops.  All of these items 
imply real costs when a labeling policy is implemented.  These added labeling and storage costs 
would drive a wedge between the price paid by consumers and received by producers resulting in 
higher prices for consumers and lower prices to producers.   
Furthermore, labeling could change an industry’s structure (Golan et al., 2000).  With some fixed 
costs associated with labeling, small firms may have higher per-unit labeling costs than large 
firms.  This would mean increasing returns to scale and an incentive for firms to increase in size 
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or close down.  A labeling policy that decreases the number of firms could decrease competition 
and might increase prices for consumers.  Another cost firms could face is reformulation costs, 
which could be large. 
The USDA suggests that adding more information to food labels dilutes the other information 
given on the label.  This concern seems most important when the labeling policy being 
considered would inform consumers of an attribute that may not affect human health (e.g., 
genetic modification).  Furthermore, labeling without independent verification is unlikely to be 
useful.  A new labeling policy would require resources for government or third-party 
verification.  
Relatively few estimates of the costs of GM food labeling exist.  The accounting/consulting firm 
KPMG was commissioned for a study in Australia and New Zealand to examine the costs of 
complying with new labeling laws.  They estimated that the costs of the labeling laws could 
mean an increase in consumer prices from 0.5 percent to 15 percent, and that firms could also 
receive lower profits (Phillips and Foster, 2000).  Even though they commissioned the study, the 
Australian New Zealand Food Standards Council (2001) disregarded KPMG’s study, citing two 
flaws.  Whether this council had legitimate problems with the study or were responding to 
political pressure, we do not know.  Smyth and Phillips (2002) estimated that a voluntary identity 
preserved production and marketing system in Canada cost from 13 to 15 percent during 1995–
1996.  The Philippine Chamber of Food Manufacturers warned that mandatory GM food labels 
would increase production costs by 15 percent, and that the increased costs would be passed on 
to consumers (AgBiotech Reporter, 2001).  One issue seems apparent:  implementing a labeling 
policy for GM foods is costly, even if the exact magnitude of the costs is unknown. 
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3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
We develop a single-period model to examine the welfare effects of alternative labeling policies.  
Following the model of food certification in Crespi and Marette (2001) and the model of GM 
labeling by Kirchhoff and Zago (2001), our model compares the welfare of a mandatory GM-
labeling policy to the welfare of a voluntary GM-labeling policy.  Assume a firm produces one 
of two products, GM food or non-GM food.  Without loss of generality, assume a firm could 
produce the GM food at a marginal cost of zero, while the marginal cost of non-GM food is 
0>c .  Firms also incur laboratory costs to test for GM content.  Assume firms that have a 
product tested to determine the GM status of their product incur a marginal cost of 0>t .   
Assume firms know whether their products are GM.  Suppose a sufficient number of firms exist 
such that, when proper signals are available, many firms would be producing GM foods and 
many firms would be producing non-GM foods.  Firms compete by Bertrand competition (by 
setting prices), so to examine the welfare effects of different labeling policies, one needs only 
look at the gains to consumers because under Bertrand competition firms earn zero profits, so 
they are indifferent to labeling policies. 
All consumers have a value 0>f  for a food product (GM or non-GM).  This could be thought 
of as the value consumers place on not starving.  In addition, tastes for non-GM foods are 
assumed to be uniformly distributed across consumers, denoted by [ ]1,0Îq .  For consumers who 
buy non-GM foods at a price of NGMp , their indirect utility is NGMpf -+q .  For consumers who 
buy GM foods at a price of GMp , their indirect utility is GMpf - .  For ease of welfare analysis, 
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simplify the mass of consumers to one.  Assume no positive or negative externalities of one 
consumer on another.1 
Consider a baseline case where no labeling of products is allowed.  Because non-GM foods are 
costlier than GM foods, only GM foods will be offered.  GM foods will be offered at a price of 
zero, because Bertrand competition brings price down to marginal cost.  The reason there is no 
non-GM food when labeling is banned is because consumers have no way of distinguishing 
between GM and non-GM foods.  A premium cannot be charged for non-GM foods, which is 
needed to cover the higher costs of producing these foods.  A consumer’s total surplus is f .  
This outcome occurs because a separating equilibrium is unavailable, and non-GM foods cannot 
be accurately signaled, leading to the classic “lemons” problem (Akerlof, 1970).  This problem 
could also occur in a voluntary labeling regime if testing costs are too high.  We next consider 
the welfare effects of alternative labeling policies:  a mandatory GM-labeling policy that requires 
testing all food products and a voluntary labeling policy that requires firms wishing to label their 
products as non-GM to test their products.  All cases assume the regulator incurs a per-unit cost 
for certification and passes that cost onto firms:  a discussion of fixed certification costs follows 
this analysis. 
3.1 Mandatory Labeling Policy—All Products Must be Tested 
Consider a mandatory GM labeling policy where all food products must be tested to determine if 
they are GM.  Foods that are GM will be labeled as “genetically modified.”  Foods that are not 
GM will not be labeled (although labeling these products as non-GM does not change the 
                                                 
1Fixed costs may also be associated with testing food products for GM content; we, however, are abstracting away 
from these costs.  They would introduce nonlinearity into the decision process but would not alter the model’s 
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analysis).  A GM product has a constant marginal cost (and price) of t , and a non-GM product 
has a marginal cost (and price) of tc + .2  The consumer surplus of individual j who purchases 
non-GM foods is 
(1) pfCS jj -+= q . 
The consumer surplus for all consumers who purchase non-GM foods is then 
(2) ( ) ( )òò --+=-+=
11
MLML
dtCfdpfCS NGMML
qq
qqqq  
(2A) ( ) ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
--+
+
-= tCfCS MLML
NGM
ML 2
1
1
q
q , 
where MLq  is the value of q  where consumers are indifferent between consuming non-GM and 
GM foods under a mandatory labeling policy.  Consumer surplus for individual j who purchases 
GM foods is 
(3) pfCS j -= . 
Aggregate consumer surplus of those who purchase GM foods is 
(4A) ( ) ( )òò -=-=
MLML
dtfdpfCS GMML
qq
qq
00
 
(4B) ( )tfCS MLGMML -= *q . 
                                                                                                                                                             
predictions.   
2This is where our model differs substantially from Kirchoff and Zago’s (2001) in that we assume that under a 
mandatory GM -labeling policy firms producing products would need to pay a per-unit charge, while Kirchoff and 
Zago assume the government would pay for all testing charges in a mandatory labeling regime.   
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3.2 Voluntary Labeling Policy—Only Non-GM Foods Need to be Tested 
Consider a voluntary labeling policy that requires testing only the products that are to be labeled 
as non-GM.  Non-GM products are labeled as non-GM.  GM products are not labeled, and 
consumers will see this as a signal that these foods are GM.  Once again, the marginal cost of 
testing a product is 0>t .  Now a GM product has a price of 0, while a non-GM product has the 
same price of tc + .  Consumer surplus of an individual who purchases non-GM foods is the 
same under either policy, as shown in equation (1).  The aggregate consumer surplus of those 
who will purchase non-GM foods is 
(5) ( ) ( )òò --+=-+=
11
VLVL
dtCfdpfCS NGMVL
qq
qqqq  
(5A) ( ) ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ --+
+
-= tCfCS VLVL
NGM
VL 2
1
1
q
q . 
VLq  is the value of q  when consumers are indifferent between consuming non-GM and GM 
foods under a mandatory labeling policy.  Consumer surplus for individual j who purchases GM 
foods under a voluntary policy is 
(6) fpfCS j =-= . 
Therefore, the aggregate consumer surplus of those who purchase GM foods is 
(7) ( ) fdfCS VLGMVL
VL
*
0
qq
q
== ò . 
Consider a third possible labeling policy that requires labeling GM products as such and not 
labeling non-GM products.  For this policy, however, firms need to test only those products they 
want to avoid labeling “genetically modified.”  Firms that do not test will be forced to label their 
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foods as GM.  Once again, the marginal cost of testing a product is 0>t .  For this case, a GM 
product will have a price of 0, while a non-GM product has a price of at + .  This mandatory 
labeling policy gives the same welfare as the voluntary labeling policy. 
This model has shown that consumer welfare is greater under the voluntary labeling policy.  If 
one considers only consumers and firms in a market (and not third-party groups), then a 
voluntary labeling policy for GM foods Pareto dominates a mandatory policy.  This is because 
voluntary and mandatory labeling policies send the same signal, but additional testing and 
segregation costs occur under a mandatory policy.  This model assumes only that food testing 
would imply a higher marginal cost; when other costs of a mandatory labeling policy are also 
considered, such as a possible increase in market concentration, mistakes in labeling, and 
dilution of the other information on the food label (Golan et al., 2000), the prediction that a 
voluntary labeling policy yields higher welfare than a mandatory policy is strengthened. 
In a market structure where firms compete by quantity (Cournot model), one obtains the same 
result if the number of firms producing GM foods and non-GM foods stays the same when a 
switch is made from a voluntary policy to a mandatory policy.  A change from a voluntary to a 
mandatory labeling policy has no effect for an individual who consumes non-GM foods and 
yields a decrease in welfare for those who consume GM foods.  Under the Cournot model, 
however, firms that produced GM foods would earn lower profits under the mandatory policy.  
The result that a voluntary labeling policy yields higher welfare than a mandatory labeling policy 
appears to be robust to the type of model used to analyze the problem. 
Where the regulator incurs a fixed cost for testing in a mandatory labeling policy and passes the 
cost along to producers, passing it along as a fixed user fee is always less efficient than passing 
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the costs along as a per-unit user fee (Crespi and Marette, 2001).  An efficient certification 
process will result in the regulator splitting the fixed cost into per-unit user fees, and the analysis 
for the per-unit certification cost applies.   
Many environmental groups are calling for a mandatory labeling policy on GM foods 
(Greenpeace, 1997; Friends of the Earth, 2001) despite the fact that consumers could purchase 
non-GM foods under a voluntary labeling policy by looking for foods with a non-GM label on it.  
This model presents an explanation for this behavior.  Suppose the utility of environmental 
groups is positively related to the number of individuals who consume non-GM foods (and 
negatively related to the number of individuals who consume GM foods).  A mandatory labeling 
policy imposes additional costs for testing on GM foods and therefore increases the number of 
individuals who would purchase non-GM foods.  The passage of a mandatory GM-labeling law 
would increase the utility of environmental groups. 
3.3 When Will a Voluntary Labeling Policy Not Allow for Signals? 
When testing to see if a product is made using genetic modification, no one will consume non-
GM foods if the test is too costly.  For any consumer that has 0<-- tCq , he will not purchase 
the non-GM food, because he is better off buying the GM food and obtaining a consumer surplus 
of f.  So if the consumer who places the highest value on non-GM food ( 1=q ) finds it too costly 
to purchase non-GM foods, ( 1>+ tC ), nobody will buy non-GM foods because the signal is too 
costly. 
This analysis implicitly assumes that consumers can distinguish the signal that a food is GM and 
a signal that a food non-GM equally well.  This is a contentious point about which  many groups, 
including Greenpeace (1997) and Friends of the Earth (2001), strongly disagree.  These groups 
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are calling for a mandatory labeling policy in the United States because, as Greenpeace (1997) 
puts it, “customers must have the right to know.”  We conducted experimental auctions to see if 
consumers behave as if they see the same signal under alternative labeling regimes or if 
consumers read the signals differently.  A discussion of the experimental design follows. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
The ongoing GM-labeling debate has been fueled by information provided by proponents and 
opponents of mandatory labeling.  Proponents of voluntary labeling policies say they are less 
expensive, because only the firms that wish to label their products must incur the labeling costs.  
In a mandatory labeling regime, all firms would need to incur additional costs, whether the costs 
are due to product testing, label design, segregation, mistakes in labeling, etc.  Many proponents 
of mandatory labeling of GM foods say that consumers have a “right to know” what they are 
consuming, and proponents claim that governments should mandate labels for foods made 
through genetic modification. 
With this general background in mind, we designed a new set of six treatments that complement 
our earlier work (Huffman et al., 2001; Rousu et al., 2002) by incorporating the private-
information-revealing feature of experimental auction markets (also see Smith 1976; Hoffman et 
al., 1993; Fox et al., 1998) and the rigorous randomized treatment design of statistical 
experimental design   We designed a set of experimental auctions in which adult consumers who 
are randomly assigned to the various treatments bid on actual foods that differed only by the 
types of labels on the foods.  Some consumers bid on foods with positive GM labels—the labels 
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that would arise in a mandatory labeling regime; others bid on food with negative GM labels—
the labels that would arise in a voluntary labeling regime.3   
The specific purpose of this experiment is to test whether consumer bidding behavior for GM 
and GM-free food is indistinguishable in two experimental markets—one within a mandatory 
labeling policy and one with a voluntary labeling policy.  If bidding behavior for GM and GM-
free food is similar across the two markets, the results would not contradict the hypothesis that 
consumers accurately read the signals in both markets.  Our empirical model suggests that a 
voluntary labeling policy is more efficient—provided consumers accurately assess which food is 
GM.  If the behavior for GM foods differed across labeling regimes, we could reject the 
hypothesis that labeling is irrelevant to choice.  Here a mandatory labeling policy would not 
necessarily lead to a welfare loss.  But if bidding behavior for GM foods is independent of the 
labeling policy, we could not reject the implications of our empirical model—that a voluntary 
labeling policy is more efficient for consumers than a mandatory labeling policy. 
The experimental design consisted of four biotech information-labeling treatments with each 
treatment replicated at least twice.  The treatments were randomly assigned to ten experimental 
                                                 
3These experimental markets were chosen to emulate the mandatory and voluntary GM -labeling regimes currently in 
place throughout the world.  Our mandatory regime reflects the labels consumers might find in Europe, where foods 
that are GM must be labeled as such.  Our voluntary labeling regime captures the labels consumers might see in the 
United States, where food manufacturers can label their products  as nongenetically engineered if they choose.  We 
do not examine several other potential but currently nonimplemented labeling policies, including a mandatory 
labeling policy that requires all non-GM foods to label themselves or a policy that requires every food product in a 
market to be labeled as GM or non-GM.   
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units, each consisting of 13 to 16 consumers drawn from the households of two major urban 
areas and who were paid to participate. 
We now describe the four elements in our GM labeling experiments—the GM food, the auction 
mechanism, the experimental units, and the specific steps in the experiment, which includes the 
detailed information on the labels.  
We anticipated that consumers might react differently to GM content for foods of different types.  
Believing that one food item was unlikely to reveal enough information, we settled on three 
items:  a 32-ounce bottle of vegetable oil,4 a 16-ounce bag of tortilla chips (made from yellow 
corn), and a 5-pound bag of russet potatoes.  In the distilling and refining process for vegetable 
oils, essentially all of the proteins (which are the components of DNA and the source of genetic 
modification) are removed leaving pure lipids.  Minimal human health concerns should arise 
from consumption of the oil, but people might still fear that the production of GM foods could 
harm the natural environment.  Tortilla chips are highly processed foods russet potatoes are 
purchased as a fresh product and generally baked or fried before eating, and consumers might 
have human health or environmental concerns or both.   
Valuation experiments use an auction mechanism to induce people to reveal their preferences for 
new goods and services (e.g., see Shogren et al., 1994).  We used the random nth-price auction 
for our GM food experiments because it is designed to engage both the on- and off-the-margin 
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bidders (see Shogren et al., 2001).5  The random nth-price works as follows.  Each of k bidders 
submits a bid for one unit of a good; then each of the bids is rank-ordered from highest to lowest.  
The auction monitor then selects a random number—the n in the nth-price auction, which is 
drawn from a uniform distribution between 2 and k, and the auction monitor sells one unit of the 
good to each of the n–1 highest bidders at the nth-price.  For instance, if the monitor randomly 
selects n = 4, the three highest bidders each purchase one unit of the good priced at the fourth 
highest bid.  Ex ante, bidders who have low or moderate valuations now have a nontrivial chance 
to buy the good because the price is determined randomly.  This auction increases the probability 
that insincere bidding will be costly. 
Auctions were planned and conducted in two Midwestern U.S. cities:  Des Moines, IA, and St. 
Paul, MN, in 2001.  The Iowa State University Statistics Laboratory acquired the sample for us 
using a random phone book sample.  The consumers were asked if they would participate in a 
group session that related “to how people select food and household products,” and they were 
                                                                                                                                                             
4For the oil, soybean oil was used for the mandatory-labeling trials, and canola oil was used for the voluntary-
labeling trials.  The soybean oil was initially used in the April experiments.  We then tried to purchase non-GM 
soybean oil in 32 oz. bottles and were unsuccessful.  The bids for the vegetable oil follow the same trend as the other 
products and are discussed in the results section of the paper.  The other products (and packaging) were absolutely 
identical, except for the presence or absence of genetic modification. 
5The auction combines elements of two classic demand-revealing mechanisms:  the Vickrey (1961) auction and the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) random pricing mechanism.  The key characteristic of the random nth price 
auction is a random but endogenously determined market-clearing price.  Randomness is used to give all 
participants a positive probability of being a purchaser of the auctioned good; the endogenous price guarantees that 
the market-clearing price is related to the bidders’ private values. 
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informed that the session would last about 90 minutes.6  They were also told that at the end of the 
session each participant would receive $40 in cash for his/her time.  From the initial sample of 
usable randomly selected numbers, the percentage of people who accepted the offer to participate 
and then showed up at the auction was approximately 19 percent.  Our total sample size of 
participants is 142.   
We held ten experimental units, four in April and six in December.  The four April trials were 
also used in Rousu et al. (2002) and Huffman et al. (2001).  The results from the other six trials 
conducted in December have not been included in previous papers.  Below we discuss the ten 
steps of the auction.  Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the auction participants.   
Figure 1 shows the ten steps in each experimental unit.  In Step 1 when participants arrived at the 
experiment, they signed a consent form agreeing to participate in the auction.  After they signed 
this form, they were given $40 for participating and an ID number to preserve their anonymity.  
The treatments were randomly assigned to each experimental unit, so the observed and 
unobserved characteristics of observations are uncorrelated with the treatments.  The participants 
                                                 
6We considered the possibility that the demand for GM foods may change over the 8 months between auctions, so 
we replicated two experimental units, using the exact same procedures.  We found no evidence that willingness to 
pay for GM -labeled foods had changed over time.  Note that subjects were also told that at the end of a session each 
participant would receive $40 in cash for their time.  The sessions were held at the Iowa State University Learning 
Connection, 7th and Locust Street, Des Moines (and lower level of the Classroom Office Building, University of 
Minnesota, St. Paul).  Three different times were available each auction day (9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm), and willing 
participants were asked to choose a time that best fit their schedule.  Participation per household was limited to two 
adult individuals, and they were assigned to different groups.  The Statistics Laboratory followed up by sending a 
letter to willing participants that contained more information including a map and instructions on when and where 
the meeting would be held, directions for getting there, and a telephone number to contact for more information. 
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then read brief instructions and filled out a questionnaire.  The questionnaire was purposefully 
given to consumers before the experiment to elicit demographic information and to capture 
consumers’ prior perception of GM foods before bidding, which allowed us to compare their 
prior beliefs to their posterior beliefs after the experiment. 
In Step 2, participants were given detailed instructions (both oral and written) about how the 
random nth-price auction works, including an example written on the blackboard.  After the 
participants learned about the auction, a short quiz was given to them to ensure that everyone 
understood how the auction worked.  All experimental instructions are available from the authors 
on request. 
Step 3 was the first practice round of bidding, in which participants bid (in a real auction) on a 
brand-name candy bar.  The participants were all asked to examine the product and then to place 
a bid on the candy bar.  The bids were collected and the first round of practice bidding was over.  
Throughout the auctions, when the participants were bidding on items in a round, they had no 
indication of what other items they may be bidding on in future rounds. 
Step 4 was the second practice round of bidding, and in this round the participants bid separately 
on three different items.  The products were the same brand-name candy bar, a deck of playing 
cards, and a box of pens.  Participants knew that only one of the two rounds would be chosen at 
random to be binding, which prevented anyone from taking home more than one unit of any 
product.  By using only round binding, we avoid problems of demand reduction that can occur in 
multi-unit auctions.  The consumers first examined the three products and then submitted their 
bids.   
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After the two practice auction rounds were completed, the binding round and the binding nth-
prices were revealed in Step 5.  All bid prices were written on the blackboard, and the nth-price 
was circled for each of the three products.  Participants could see immediately what items they 
won, and the price they would pay.  The participants were told that the exchange of money for 
goods was in another room nearby and would take place after the entire experiment was 
completed. 
In Step 6, participants received one of two potential info-packets that provided nonfood-label 
information about biotechnology (for a detailed look at how information affected the demand for 
foods labeled as GM, see Rousu et al., 2002).  These info-packets were produced as follows.  We 
created three information sources:  (1) the industry perspective—a collection of statements and 
information on genetic modification provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies, 
including Monsanto and Syngenta; (2) the environmental group perspective—a collection of 
statements and information on genetic modification from Greenpeace, a leading environmental 
group; and (3) the independent third party perspective—a statement on genetic modification 
approved by a third-party group, consisting of a variety of people knowledgeable about GM 
goods, including scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics, who do not have a 
financial stake in GM foods.  We limited each information source to one full page, organized 
into five categories:  general information, scientific impact, human impact, financial impact, and 
environmental impact.  Appendix A shows the exact format and wording of the three information 
sources.   
These information sources were then randomized to create the two info-packets:  (1) both pro- 
and antibiotechnology and (2) probiotechnology, antibiotechnology, and independently 
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verifiable.7  These info-packets were then randomized among all ten experimental units, with 
each info-packet going to four experimental units.  By giving all participants both positive and 
negative information on GM foods, and by giving some participants a third-party perspective on 
GM foods, we could determine the willingness to pay for individuals who received all 
perspectives on the GM food debate. 
Once we distributed the appropriate info-packet to the participants in a given unit, we then 
conducted two auction rounds.  The rounds were differentiated by the food label—either the food 
had a standard food label or a label that indicated the status of genetic modification.  Figure 2 
shows the exact format of the label used for potatoes.8  In one round (which could be Round 1 or 
2 depending on the experimental unit), participants were bidding on the three food products each 
with the standard food label.  We made these labels as plain as possible to avoid any influence on 
the bids from the label design.  In the other round, participants were bidding on the same three 
food products with either a GM label or a non-GM label.  The GM and non-GM labels differed 
from the standard label only by the inclusion of one extra sentence.  The GM label said “This 
product is made using genetic engineering,” while the non-GM label said “This product is made 
without genetic engineering.”  For each experimental unit, participants knew that only one round 
would be chosen as the binding round that determined auction winners.   
                                                 
7The order of the positive information and negative information was, also, randomized across consumers.  
Participants who received the third-party, verifiable information always received it after the other information 
sources. 
8Note that our labels are clearly displayed on the front of the package, where consumers would see them.  See 
Noussair et al. (2002) for evidence of how consumers are not always likely to read food-labels that are on the back 
of packages. 
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In Step 7, participants bid on three different food products:  a bottle of vegetable oil, a bag of 
tortilla chips and a bag of potatoes, either with the standard label or the label indicating the 
product’s GM status.  Six groups bid on foods with plain labels and foods with labels saying 
“made using genetic modification.”  Four groups bid on foods with plain labels and foods with 
labels saying “made without using genetic modification.”  The participants were instructed to 
examine the three products and then to write down their sealed bid for each of the three goods.  
Participants bid on each good separately.  The monitor then collected the bids from the people 
and told them they were next going to look at another group of food items.  Figure 3 summarizes 
the four treatments. 
Step 8 had participants examine the same three food products, each with a different label from 
Round 1.9  Again the participants examined the products and bid on the three products 
separately.  The bids were then collected from all of the individuals.  In contrast to early 
experimental auction work using repeated trials, this auction used only two rounds to avoid any 
chance of affiliation of values and changes in willingness to pay due to the posted-market 
behavior of other bidders (see List and Shogren, 1999; Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler, 2001). 
Step 9 selected the binding round, and the binding random nth-prices for the three goods.  The 
winners were notified.  In Step 10, each participant was asked to complete a brief post-auction 
                                                 
9By replicating treatments and having one group bid on the plain-labeled foods in Round 1 and the GM (or non-GM) 
labeled foods in Round 2, we are controlling for any potential round effects.  The null hypothesis that the round the 
consumer bid on foods led to the same bids could not be rejected at a 5 percent level for any of the three goods 
under both a t-test and a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test.  Hence, the order in which consumers saw the items did not 
appear to matter. 
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questionnaire, and then the monitors dismissed the participants who did not win.  The monitors 
and the winners then exchanged money for goods, and the auction winners were also dismissed. 
Although we followed standard experimental auction valuation procedures (e.g., Shogren et al., 
1994), we made several refinements to our experimental design to better reflect consumer 
purchases.  First, our subjects submitted only one bid per product.  We have stepped back from 
the protocol of using multiple repeated trials and posted market-clearing prices to avoid any 
question of creating affiliated values that can affect the demand-revealing nature of a laboratory 
auction (see, for example, List and Shogren, 1999).  Second, we do no t endow our subjects with 
any food item and then ask them to “upgrade” to another food item; rather participants are paid 
$40 and then bid on different foods in only two trials.  This avoids the risk that an in-kind 
endowment effect distorts the participant’s bidding behavior (e.g., Lusk and Shroeder, 2002) and 
of any credit constraint.  Third, each consumer bid on three unrelated food items, such that if he 
or she did not have positive demand for one or two products, we could still obtain information 
from them on their preference for genetic modification based on the second and (or) third 
products.  Fourth, we randomly assigned treatments to the experimental units—now estimating 
treatment effect is simply the difference in means across treatments (see Wooldridge, 2001).   
Fifth, we used adult consumers over 18 years of age from two different Midwestern metropolitan 
areas that were chosen using a random digit dialing method.  The demographics of our sample do 
not perfectly match the U.S. census demographic characteristics for these regions, but they are 
similar and provide a sufficient representation for our initial probe into labeling and information 
for GM products (see Appendix A for the demographic characteristics of the areas).  In addition, 
because we use common food items available to shoppers in grocery stores and supermarkets, we 
wanted adults rather than students to better reflect a typical household of consumers.  Although 
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several studies have used college undergraduates in laboratory auctions of food items (including 
Lusk et al., 2001a and Hayes et al., 1995), they are not the best choice for participants when the 
items being auctioned are ones sold in grocery stores or supermarkets.  Using a national random 
sample of grocery store shoppers, Katsara et al. (2001) show that the share of college-age (18 to 
24) shoppers falls far below their share in the population—8.5 percent of shoppers versus 12.8 
percent in the U.S. Census of Population.  College students obtain a large share of their food 
from school cafeterias and a small share from grocery stores and supermarkets compared to older 
shoppers (Carlson, Kinsey, and Nadav, 1998).  Although our participants are slightly skewed 
toward women, Katsara et al. (2001) show that women make up a disproportional share of 
grocery shoppers—83 percent of shoppers versus 52 percent in the U.S. Census of Population.  A 
sample primarily of grocery store shoppers also weakens the sometimes-stated need for having 
students participate in several rounds of bidding to stabilize bids for food items.  We also 
minimize Hawthorne effects in bidding (Melton et al., 1996). 
Sixth, information from our laboratory experiments is complemented by information obtained 
from pre- and post-experiment surveys administered to participants.  The pre-auction survey 
allowed us to obtain socio-demographic information and information on participants’ beliefs 
about GM and other technologies before treatment.  This information is potentially useful for 
explaining bidding behavior.  Post-auction questions were used to solicit information from 
participants on who they would trust to provide verifiable information on GM technology, a 
concept introduced in the experiments. 
Finally, the reason these experiments are conducted is novel.  We derived a model that shows 
that a voluntary labeling policy for GM foods is superior to a mandatory labeling policy, if the 
critical assumption that consumers identically read signals accurately in both markets.  The 
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novelty is that we actually are testing this critical assumption using experiments—a step that 
most studies do not attempt. 
5. DATA AND RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the mean and median bids.  Eighty-six participants were in treatments that bid on 
the plain- labeled and GM-labeled food products, while 56 participants were in treatments that 
bid on the plain- labeled and non-GM-labeled food products.  For the participants who bid on the 
GM-labeled and plain- labeled foods, consumers discounted the GM-labeled oil by an average of 
11 cents, the GM-labeled chips by 8 cents, and the GM-labeled potatoes by 8 cents.  The 
participants who bid on the plain- labeled food and the non-GM-labeled food discounted the 
plain- labeled oil by an average of 4 cents, the plain- labeled chips by 7 cents, and the plain-
labeled potatoes by 9 cents.   
Our main goal is to determine whether consumers can accurately decipher which food is GM 
irrespective of the labeling treatment.  To determine whether consumers perceive the GM signals 
differently in the two markets, we first examine the difference in bids for the perceived GM 
product and the perceived non-GM product.  In the mandatory- labeling trials, the GM-labeled 
food is the perceived GM product; the plain- labeled food is the perceived non-GM product.  In 
the voluntary- labeling trials, the plain- labeled food is the perceived GM product; the non-GM 
labeled food is the perceived non-GM product.   
Table 3 presents results from a test of the null hypothesis that no difference in bids for the 
perceived GM and the perceived non-GM bids exists.  For all three products, we reject the null 
hypothesis that consumers’ bids for the perceived GM and the perceived non-GM foods are 
25 
equal.  This result suggests that the average consumer bids less for the food that is signaled as 
GM, which supports earlier findings reported by Huffman et al. (2001) and Lusk et al. (2001a). 
Table 4 presents results from tests of the null hypothesis that the bids for the perceived GM and 
non-GM products are equal across the two treatments.  Did consumers bid the same for the plain-
labeled product in the GM-labeled treatment as they did for the non-GM-labeled product in the 
non-GM treatment?  For each product, we test two separate null hypotheses: 
(8) labelednon labelneg
labeledGM
labelpos BidBidH
-- = __0 :  
(9) labelednon labelpos
labeledGMnon
labelneg BidBidH
--- = __0 : . 
The null hypothesis in expression (8) tests the hypothesis that the bids for the perceived GM 
foods and the bids for the perceived non-GM foods are the same in either labeling treatment.  
The superscripts indicate the type of food product; the subscripts indicate the labeling treatment.  
The null hypothesis in expression (9) tests the hypothesis that the bids for the perceived non-GM 
labeled foods are the same in both trials.  Table 4 shows that one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the average bids are identical.  This suggests that consumers accurately read the 
signals for which food is GM under either a mandatory or a voluntary labeling regime.   
The size of the discount for the perceived GM food provides additional evidence about 
consumers’ perception of the signals from the two labeling regimes.  We tested null hypotheses 
that consumers did not discount the perceived GM food in the two markets differently.  Table 5 
provides the results.  The first column shows the difference in bids in the mandatory- labeling 
trials; the second column shows the difference in bids in the voluntary- labeling trials.  The third 
column is the difference between these columns.  The absolute difference is an average of 7 
cents for vegetable oil, 1 cent for the tortilla chips, and 1 cent for the potatoes.  At the 10 percent 
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significance level, the tests show that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference in 
bids is zero for any of the three food products.10  Although none of the differences are 
statistically significant, at first glance it is curious that the mean discount under mandatory and 
voluntary labeling regimes is virtually identical for the tortilla chips and potatoes, yet it is 
considerably larger for the vegetable oil.  A possible explanation for the vegetable oil having an 
average of 7-cents difference is the fact that we used two different types of vegetable oils.11   
Consumers discounted perceived GM food the same, irrespective of whether the market had 
mandatory or voluntary GM labeling.  This result provides additional evidence that consumers 
receive the same signals under either regime.  By not rejecting the thesis that consumers know 
GM from non-GM food regardless of the labeling regimes, the results support our empirical 
analysis—the less-expensive voluntary GM-labeling policy could yield greater overall welfare 
than a mandatory GM-labeling policy.  Without speculating beyond the reach of the lab, this 
finding supports those who believe the United States has been prudent in avoiding calls to 
initiate a mandatory GM-labeling policy. 
                                                 
10Regression models were also fitting to test whether demographic characteristics made a difference on the discount 
for the perceived GM food.  No demographic characteristic affected significantly the discount for the perceived GM 
food.  Also, one could not reject the null hypothesis that third-party information did not affect the difference in the 
discount for the perceived GM food. 
11To check the robustness of the results, we also ran Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests to see if one could reject that 
consumers had different behavior for the different label types.  The results for the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests are 
similar to those of the t-test results, showing that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that consumers perceive the 
signals from the two labeling policies the same.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
GM food labeling remains an important and politically contentious issue in the United States.  
Many groups call for mandatory labeling of GM foods, while many others want to keep labeling 
voluntary.  This paper provides evidence that a voluntary labeling policy is more efficient than a 
mandatory labeling policy in the United States.  The reason is that voluntary labeling policies are 
less expensive and still give consumers the choice to consume GM or non-GM foods.  This result 
depends on consumers’ ability to read signals identically in either market, a conclusion that our 
auction market evidence could not reject.  One further avenue for research would be to examine 
the international dimension to GM food labels, say in Europe or Australia.  For example, do 
consumers in those countries read the same signals of genetic modification in voluntary labeling 
markets as in mandatory labeling markets?  The key issue is the relevance and usefulness of the 
mandatory labeling policies throughout the world.   
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Figure 1:  Steps in the experiment 
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Figure 2:  The three types of labels used for the potatoes 
Russet Potatoes
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Figure 3:  Information and labeling given to the four treatments 
Treatment Labeling regime type Third party Number or trials per treatment 
1. Voluntary regime No 2 
2. Voluntary regime Yes 2 
3. Mandatory regime No 4 
4 Mandatory regime Yes 2 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of the auction participants 
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev 
Gender 1 if female 0.60 0.49 
Age The participant’s age 51.40 18.1 
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.65 0.48 
Education Years of schooling 14.74 2.36 
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.56 1.49 
Income The household’s income level (in thousands) 51.60 33.40 
White 1 if participant is white 0.92 0.27 
Read_L 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.02 0.14 
 1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.32 
 1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.32 0.47 
 1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.36 0.48 
 1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.18 0.39 
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Table 2:  Mean bids  
 n Mean Bid Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
A.  Mean bids when participants bid on food in a mandatory GM-labeling market 
GM oil 86 0.63 0.65 0.50 0 2.75 
Oil 86 0.74 0.75 0.50 0 3.29 
GM chips 86 0.61 0.70 0.43 0 3.25 
Chips 86 0.69 0.72 0.50 0 2.89 
GM potatoes 86 0.59 0.54 0.50 0 2.00 
Potatoes 86 0.67 0.54 0.50 0 2.25 
B.  Mean bids when participants bid on food in a voluntary GM-labeling market 
NGM oil 56 0.80 0.80 0.50 0 4.75 
Oil 56 0.76 0.68 0.50 0 3.00 
NGM chips 56 0.75 0.81 0.50 0 4.00 
Chips 56 0.68 0.77 0.50 0 4.00 
NGM potatoes 56 0.84 0.75 0.75 0 4.00 
Potatoes 56 0.75 0.70 0.68 0 4.00 
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Table 3: T-test for null hypothesis that bids for the perceived GM food are equal to bids 
for  perceived non-GM food (n = 142) 
 Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil  0.08 2.04* 
Chips  0.07 2.64** 
Potatoes  0.09 3.31** 
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
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Table 4: T-test for null hypothesis that bids for perceived GM and non-GM foods are 
equal under alternative labeling regimes (n = 142) 
Perceived GM/ 
Non-GM Food 
Mean Bid—
Mandatory Regime  
Mean Bid—
Voluntary Regime  Difference 
T-Test 
Statistic 
GM oil 0.74 0.80 0.06 1.10 
Non-GM oil 0.63 0.76 0.13 0.45 
GM chips 0.69 0.75 0.06 0.56 
Non-GM chips 0.61 0.68 0.07 0.53 
GM potatoes 0.59 0.75 0.16 1.53 
Non-GM potatoes 0.67 0.84 0.17 1.57 
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Table 5: T-test of null hypothesis that differences of biding differences are equal under 
two regimes  
 
Difference—
Mandatory Regime  
Difference— 
Voluntary Regime  Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.90 
Chips 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 
Potatoes 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.20 
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Appendix A:  Information Given to Participants.  Antibiotechnology Information 
The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from Greenpeace, a 
leading environmental group. 
General Information 
Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources today.  There 
are many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly because unknown adverse 
effects could be catastrophic!  Inadequate safety testing of GM plants, animals, and food products has 
occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM foods are safe.  Consumers should not have 
to test new food products to ensure that they are safe. 
Scientific Impact 
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into another.  This 
process is very risky.  The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM) foods is the unknown.  
This is a relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that consumers will not be harmed.  
Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that there would be no harm to consumers 
over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims were wrong.  We do not want consumers to be 
harmed by GM food. 
Human Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems.  The potential exists for allergens to be 
transferred to a GM food product that no one would suspect.  For example, if genes from a peanut were 
transferred into a tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats this new tomato, they could display 
a peanut allergy. 
Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue.  These foods are taking genes from one 
living organism and transplanting them into another.  Many people think it is morally wrong to mess 
around with life forms on such a fundamental level. 
Financial Impact 
GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about their own profits 
and ignore possible negative side effects.  These groups are actually patenting different life forms that 
they genetically modify, with plans to sell them in the future.  Studies have also shown that GM crops 
may get lower yields than conventional crops. 
Environmental Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards.  Sparse testing of GM plants for 
environmental impacts has occurred.  One potential hazard could be the impact of GM crops on wildlife.  
One study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies.   
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM plants that were 
engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application.  The harmful insects and other pests that get exposed 
to these crops could quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of the potential advantages of GM pest 
resistance. 
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Information Given to Participants, Probiotechnology Information 
The following is collection of statements and information on genetic modification provided by a group of 
leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta.   
General Information 
Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest discoveries in the 
history of farming.  Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and disease resistance and 
weed control.  These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology lead to reduced cost of food 
production.  Future GM food products may have health benefits.   
Scientific Impact 
Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Genetic engineering has brought new opportunities to farmers for 
pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient enhanced foods.  GM plants and 
animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in the history of agriculture.  We have just 
seen the tip of the iceberg of future potential.   
Human Impact 
The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous.  A special type of rice called “golden 
rice” has already been created which has higher levels of vitamin A.  This could be very helpful because 
the disease Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) is devastating in third-world countries.  VAD causes 
irreversible blindness in over 500,000 children, and is also responsible for over one million deaths 
annually.  Since rice is the staple food in the diets of millions of people in the third world, Golden Rice 
has the potential of improving millions of lives a year by reducing the cases of VAD. 
The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and Americans have been consuming GM 
foods for years.  While every food product may pose risks, there has never been a documented case of a 
person getting sick from GM food. 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which means lower food prices, 
and that can help feed the world.  In America, lower food prices help decrease the number of hungry 
people and also lets consumers save a little more money on food.  Worldwide the number of hungry 
people has been declining, but increased crop production using GM technology can also help further 
reduce world hunger.   
Environmental Impact 
GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical insecticide application 
by 50 percent or more.  This means less environmental damage.  GM weed control is providing new 
methods to control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till farming.  Genetic modification of plants 
has the potential to be one of the most environmentally helpful discoveries ever. 
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Information given to participants, independe nt, verifiable information 
The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group, consisting of a 
variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods, including scientists, professionals, 
religious leaders, and academics.  These parties have no financial stake in genetically modified foods. 
General Information 
Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across plants or animals, a 
process that would not otherwise occur (In common usage, genetic modification means bioengineering).  
With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is somewhat similar to the process of how a flu 
shot works in the human body.  Flu shots work by injecting a virus into the body to help make a human 
body more resistant to the flu.  Bioengineered plant-pest resistance causes a plant to enhance its own pest 
resistance. 
Scientific Impact 
The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, cereals, potatoes, etc.) is 
based on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although they have been modified 
slightly from the original plant materials.   
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process removed essentially all the 
GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils.  So even if GM crops were deemed to be harmful for 
human consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils would cause harm. 
Human Impact 
While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your grocers’ shelf, there are 
currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic modification has increased nutrient content. 
All foods present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people.  No FDA approved GM food poses 
any known unique human health risks. 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek profits.  For farmers 
to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch.  However, genetic modification 
technology may lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business industry and farming.  The 
introduction of GM foods has the potential to decrease the prices to consumers for groceries. 
Environmental Impact 
The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown.  Bioengineered insect 
resistance has reduced farmers’ applications of environmentally hazardous insecticides.  More studies are 
occurring to help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and organisms on the environment.  A couple 
of studies reported harm to Monarch butterflies from GM crops, but other scientists were not able to 
recreate the results.  The possibility of insects growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate concern.   
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Appendix B: Demographic Characteristics of Polk County, IA (including Des Moines 
area) and Ramsey County, MN (including St. Paul area) 
Variable Definition Polk Ramsey Average 
Gender 1 if female 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Age Median age 45.70 45.70 45.70 
Married 1 if the individual is married* 59.50 51.40 55.50 
Education Years of schooling** 13.52 13.76 13.64 
Income The median household’s income 
level (in thousands) 
46.10 45.70 45.90 
White 1 if participant is white 0.90 0.80 0.85 
Note:  All variables are for individuals of all ages, except for married, which is for individuals 18 or older; 
education, which is for individuals 25 or older; and age, which is for individuals 20 or older. 
*The estimate of the number of married people who are 18 or older was obtained by taking the number of people 
married over 15 and assuming that the number of people who were married at ages 15, 16, and 17 was zero.  This 
gives the percentage of people who are married who are 18 or older. 
**The years of schooling was estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not completed 9th grade, 10.5 
for those who have not completed high school, 12 for those who have completed high school but have had no 
college, 13.5 for those with some college but no degree, 14 for those with an associate’s degree, 16 for those with 
a bachelor’s degree, and 18 for those with a graduate or professional degree. 
